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Defending Worldwide Taxation With A Shareholder-
Based Definition Of Corporate Residence* 
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,** Robert J. Peroni*** & Stephen E. Shay**** 
This Article argues that a principled, efficient, and practical 
definition of corporate residence is necessary even if some form of 
corporate integration is adopted, and that such a definition is a key 
element in designing either a real worldwide or a territorial income tax 
system as well as a potential restraint on the inversion phenomenon.  The 
Article proposes that the United States adopt a shareholder-based 
definition of corporate residence that is structured as follows: 
 
1. A foreign corporation is a U.S. tax resident for any year if fifty 
percent or more of its shares, determined by vote or value, was 
beneficially owned by U.S. residents on the last day of the 
immediately preceding year (or was the average ownership for the 
year by U.S. residents as determined by averaging U.S. resident 
ownership on the last day of each quarter of the preceding year). 
A foreign corporation presumptively satisfies this test if any class 
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of its shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital 
markets or is marketed to U.S. persons. 
2. This presumption can be rebutted by the foreign corporation 
showing that U.S. resident beneficial ownership of its shares is 
below the fifty-percent threshold. 
3. The presumption can be overcome in the same way by the IRS if 
it encounters cases where a foreign corporation that is actually 
foreign-owned lists a class of shares on a U.S. exchange in order 
to achieve U.S. resident status for tax-avoidance reasons. 
 
This proposed shareholder-ownership test, however, would be an 
alternate definition; a corporation would continue to be a U.S. tax 
resident if it were formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction. Finally, 
this Article examines the common objections to a shareholder-based 
definition of corporate residence and explains why those objections are 
unpersuasive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Unavoidable Challenge 
In the U.S. legal system, corporations are intangible fictional 
entities created by legal fiat to achieve various ends that are considered 
worthwhile.1 But precisely because corporations are fictional, they do 
not live anywhere.2 Thus, determining where a corporation resides is 
a much more difficult endeavor than determining the residence of a 
human being. 
This difficult query cannot be dodged, however, and it has 
foundational significance. It is an accepted international norm that a 
country may tax a resident corporation on its worldwide income, 
though it may choose not to exercise the full extent of its taxing 
jurisdiction. In contrast, a foreign corporation may be taxed only on 
income with some nexus to the taxing country.3 A worldwide taxation 
 
 1. A principal reason for the corporate fiction is to promote investments in corporations 
by creating a liability shield to protect investors from creditor claims that exceed the amounts 
invested, subject to a number of exceptions allowing the corporate liability shield to be pierced. 
Within the income tax, corporations serve as a single point for levying the tax that is much more 
convenient than pursuing individual shareholders. 
 2. See Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 
261, 320 (2001) [hereinafter Graetz, Taxing International Income] (“[I]n the case of 
corporations, the idea of residence is largely an effort to put flesh into fiction, to find economic 
and political substance in a world occupied by legal niceties.”); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Source As 
a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX. REV. 471, 479–80 (2015) (“The difficulty with defining 
residency for entities is that the most straightforward way to define residency—physical 
presence—is not available, simply because legal entities cannot be physically present in the same 
manner as individuals.”). Given this fact, as we understand it, Professor David Elkins, 
commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, took the position that the residence of 
corporations should be disregarded in determining whether and how to tax corporate income.  
Instead, in his view, it is the residence of the shareholders of the corporation that is the relevant 
factor in determining the proper tax treatment of corporate income. We look forward to reading 
his future paper on this topic. 
 3. 1 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 412(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
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system, which the United States employs in form,4 observes these 
norms by taxing resident corporations on the sum of their domestic-
source and foreign-source incomes,5 while taxing nonresident 
corporations only on U.S.-source income.6 Thus, a worldwide system 
rests in part on its classification of a corporation as a resident as 
distinguished from a nonresident corporation.7 The fictional nature of 
the corporate form makes this distinction inherently difficult to draw. 
It does not seem likely that the United States can avoid this 
challenge by moving towards an explicit territorial or exemption 
system that would forgo U.S. taxation of foreign-source business 
income. This is so because the most viable current territorial proposals 
would adopt a form of U.S. final minimum tax on foreign income,8 
under which U.S. taxation of foreign income would still be heavier 
than the burden imposed by the tax laws of most other countries, and 
the benefit of avoiding U.S. income tax by eroding the U.S. tax base 
would remain.9 Accordingly, a politically plausible U.S. territorial 
 
 4. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than 
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than 
Exemption] (explaining why the U.S. international income taxation system is a worldwide system 
in form but largely an incoherent and elective quasi-territorial system in substance). 
 5. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). 
 6. See I.R.C. §§ 881, 882, 864(c)(2)–(3) (2012). However, certain limited categories of 
foreign-source income of a nonresident corporation that are closely connected with the conduct 
of a U.S. trade or business are subject to U.S. income tax. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4) (2012). 
 7. In important places, the Internal Revenue Code uses the term “domestic 
corporation” to refer to a U.S. corporate resident and the term “foreign corporation” to refer 
to a nonresident corporation. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 881(a), 882(a), 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2012). For 
this purpose, a domestic corporation is defined as one that is “created or organized in the United 
States or under the law of the United States or of any State” and a foreign corporation is any 
other corporation. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4)–(5) (2012). The District of Columbia is treated as a 
State and as geographically part of the United States for purposes of this definition. I.R.C. § 
7701(a)(9)–(10) (2012). For convenience, we refer to domestic corporations as U.S. residents 
and foreign corporations as U.S. nonresidents throughout this Article. 
 8. Representative Camp’s tax reform proposal would have provided for a minimum tax 
on foreign income. See H.R. 1, 113th Cong., §§ 4201, 4211 (2014). The Obama 
Administration’s framework for corporate tax reform also includes a minimum tax on foreign 
income using a different base and tax rate. WHITE HOUSE & U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, THE 
PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 24 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-
Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf. 
 9. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Designing a 21st 
Century Corporate Tax—An Advance U.S. Minimum Tax on Foreign Income and Other Measures 
to Protect the Base, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 717–21 (2015) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, 
Designing a 21st Century Corporate Tax]. Professor Adam Rosenzweig has observed that the 
question at issue in defining corporate residence is whether a country wants to exercise its taxing 
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regime will not eliminate the unavoidable incentives under the current 
law for U.S. resident corporations to become nonresidents, nor will it 
eliminate the need for an effective U.S. response.10 
A second, and possibly more important, reason why U.S. adoption 
of a territorial-based system would not eliminate the need to deal with 
the corporate residence conundrum is that conventional territorial 
regimes typically have a worldwide taxation component. Specifically, 
territorial countries often apply worldwide taxation to passive foreign 
income and tax haven business income received by their corporate 
residents.11 Assuming that a U.S. territorial-based system would follow 
 
power, including reporting and withholding obligations, over foreign-source income. 
Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 481. Recent corporate inversion activity has illuminated the ability 
of a nonresident parent group to also earnings-strip the U.S. tax base. See Stephen E. Shay, J. 
Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Treasury’s Unfinished Work on Corporate Expatriations, 
150 TAX NOTES 933, 935 (2016) [hereinafter Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Treasury’s 
Unfinished Work]. 
 10. Professor Omri Marian has pointed out that the concept of corporate residence would 
have a critical role in a U.S. territorial regime because the operation of important source rules is 
controlled by residence, see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(1)–(2), 865(a), (e) (2012), and these rules 
are unlikely to be changed. See Omri Marian, The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in 
Territorial Systems, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 157, 159 (2014). While that is correct under current law, 
we have argued that source rules are “instruments for implementing source taxing jurisdiction 
and effecting residence country accommodation of source country taxation” and could be 
modified to suit the appropriate purpose. Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. 
Peroni, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture—“What’s Source Got to Do with It?”—Source Rules and 
U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 83, 138–39, 147 (2002) [hereinafter Shay, 
Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules]. For this reason, we do not think classification of an entity as 
resident is fundamentally linked to determining the source of income. 
One might ask whether the United States would adopt the U.S. House of Representatives 
Republican tax plan to replace the income tax on business income with a destination-based cash 
flow tax (see MAJORITY MEMBERS OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, A BETTER WAY: OUR 
VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA, TAX REFORM TASK FORCE BLUEPRINT 24–29 (June 24, 
2016), http://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf), in 
which case the pressure on corporate residence would be reduced. The House Republican 
business tax proposal carries a very high revenue cost, would create significant winners and losers, 
and has no direct analog in the world today. In addition to being a radical change, there is no 
comparable U.S. Senate plan. For these reasons, we do not consider a destination-based cash 
flow tax as a replacement for the business income tax to be a likely alternative. 
 11. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 112TH CONG., JCX-33-11, BACKGROUND 
AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS THAT 
EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME 8 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., BACKGROUND AND 
ISSUES]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter JOINT 
COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE]; U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 57, 59–60 
(2007); HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 447–48 (3d ed. 2010); Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. 
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this conventional pattern, the United States would have to address the 
issue of properly defining corporate residence in order to implement 
the worldwide taxation component of its territorial regime. 
B. The Defect of Current U.S. Law 
Under present U.S. federal income tax law, a corporation is a 
foreign resident if it was formed under foreign law and a U.S. resident 
if it was formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction.12 Thus, residence 
is elective in the sense that because there are virtually no legal 
limitations on the power of relevant business decision makers to 
choose between formation in a U.S. or a foreign jurisdiction, U.S. law 
effectively gives those decision makers significant discretion in 
determining the residence of corporations engaged in 
international activities.13 
The most prominent current issue that arises, in part, from the 
malleability of the U.S. corporate resident definition, is the inversion 
problem. Specifically, a U.S. resident corporation has considerable 
latitude to transform itself into a foreign resident by combining with 
a foreign corporation if, after the transaction, the former shareholders 
of the U.S. corporation own less than eighty percent of the surviving 
 
TAX REV. 699, 717 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income]; Katrin Laschewski & 
Christian Laschewski, The Impact of the International Tax System of the Home Country on the 
Location Decision of a Foreign Permanent Establishment: The Case of Germany, WORLD TAX J., 
June 2015, at 171, 172–74 (2015); see also Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Designing a 21st Century 
Corporate Tax, supra note 9, at 685–86 (noting that all countries’ international tax systems are 
hybrids that contain elements of both the worldwide and territorial approaches). 
 12. See supra note 7. 
 13. Studies have shown that despite the few legal limitations on the power to choose 
between foreign and U.S. incorporation, U.S. headquartered corporations that engage in 
international activities are, in fact, usually formed in a U.S. jurisdiction. See Eric J. Allen & Susan 
C. Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L 
TAX J. 395, 406–09 (2013); Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial 
Incorporation Location, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 319, 329–33 (2013) (discussing how U.S.-based 
startups are also generally incorporated in the United States); see also DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, 
FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 69–75 (2014) [hereinafter SHAVIRO, FIXING] 
(discussing non-tax factors that lead to U.S. incorporation); Susan C. Morse & Eric J. Allen, 
Innovation and Taxation at Start-up Firms, 69 TAX L. REV. 357, 360–61 (2016) (model 
suggesting tax planning, including using a pass-through entity, may not be cost effective for 
start-ups but more plausible after a start-up receives external financing). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that if the relevant decision makers determine that the tax benefits of foreign incorporation are 
sufficiently attractive, they have substantial freedom to elect foreign incorporation, particularly 
for foreign-headquartered subsidiaries. 
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foreign corporation.14 As a result of this metamorphosis, a former U.S. 
corporation’s future foreign-source income can avoid becoming 
subject to U.S. tax, and the surviving foreign corporation can pursue 
an earnings stripping strategy.15 That is, the surviving foreign 
corporation can extract deductible interest, royalties, and service fee 
payments from its U.S. subsidiaries.16 Because these payments are 
deductible, U.S. tax is avoided pro tanto.17 
Inversions, however, are not the only problematic transactions 
that result from the manipulability of the U.S. corporate residence 
definition. For example, assume that USCorp, formed under the laws 
of Delaware, contemplates building a new factory to sell products to 
U.S. consumers. USCorp can employ an Irish subsidiary to build, 
own, and operate the factory, and then have that subsidiary sell its 
output to USCorp. Aggressive transfer pricing can then be used 
regarding the Irish subsidiary’s sales to USCorp so that much of the 
profit from exploiting the U.S. market is income of the Irish 
 
 14. See I.R.C. §§ 7874(a)(2), 7874(b) (2012). 
 15. See generally J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting 
Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework, 93 N.C. 
L. REV. 673, 680–86 (2015) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping] 
(explaining and illustrating the earnings stripping problem). 
 16. Id. at 681 n.19 and accompanying text. 
 17. See generally id. at 680–87 (explaining and illustrating, again, the earnings stripping 
problem). Adoption of a U.S. territorial system would not eliminate the benefit of earnings 
stripping. Because the top U.S. corporate rate is, even after a reduction to, say 25 percent, likely 
to remain substantially above the top rate in reasonably stable tax havens (e.g., Bermuda, Ireland, 
and the United Kingdom), see JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41743, 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAX RATE COMPARISONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1, 16–18 
(2014); MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44013, 
CORPORATE TAX BASE EROSION AND PROFITS SHIFTING (BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
DATA 21 (2015), it would continue to be worthwhile from a tax minimization point of view to 
use deductible payments to move income from the U.S. tax base to related tax haven 
corporations even if the United States adopts a territorial regime. Indeed, adoption of a U.S. 
territorial system would increase the incentive to strip earnings out of the U.S. tax base. See 
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping, supra note 15, at 684. Thus, strengthened anti-
earnings stripping rules are necessary, even if the United States goes territorial. As stated by 
Willard Taylor: 
Inversions are not, and never were, solely about voting-with-your feet, or electing 
into, an exemption system of taxation for foreign business income. . . . A dollar earned 
in the United States is taxed at a 35 percent rate but if paid as interest to the new Irish 
parent is taxed at a 12.5 percent rate at most (and is not subject to withholding under 
the U.S.-Ireland treaty.) This has little to do with whether or not the United States 
adopts an exemption or territorial system . . . . 
Willard B. Taylor, Letter to the Editor, A Comment on Eric Solomon’s Article on Corporate 
Inversions, TAX NOTES, Oct. 1, 2012, at 105, 105. 
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subsidiary. Because the Irish subsidiary is a nonresident of the United 
States under current U.S. law, this foreign-source income will bear no 
U.S. tax until it is paid to USCorp in the form of dividends or until 
USCorp sells the Irish subsidiary’s stock at a price that reflects its 
accumulated income.18 The significant value of this deferral of U.S. tax 
is well-recognized.19 Moreover, there is no guarantee that the Irish 
subsidiary will actually pay out a substantial amount of its profits as 
dividends or that its stock will be sold. 
C. Relevance to Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation 
In short, the present U.S. definition of corporate residence makes 
it easy to transform what would otherwise be foreign active business 
income of U.S. corporations into foreign active business income that 
escapes a current U.S. tax. This fact has implications that go beyond 
the inversion phenomenon. To be specific, because foreign corporate 
residence, and corresponding freedom from U.S. tax with respect to 
foreign-source active business income are substantially elective, this 
might suggest that the only corporate income that the United States 
can feasibly tax is U.S.-source income. And, consequently, as the 
argument goes, the United States should accept this reality by 
abandoning efforts to employ worldwide taxation and, instead, adopt 
a territorial system under which U.S. taxing jurisdiction over foreign-
source active business income would be formally surrendered.20 
If this were the case, would a necessary implication also be that 
the United States should deviate from common practice by structuring 
its territorial regime so that passive and tax haven income are also 
 
 18. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, 
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 303 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the operation 
of the deferral principle). 
 19. See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than Exemption, supra note 4, at 96–104 
(discussing the value of the deferral principle); see also SHAVIRO, FIXING, supra note 13, at 55 
(characterizing deferral as a “tax preference”); Patrick Driessen, Would Territoriality Be a Tax 
Expenditure?, 146 TAX NOTES  647, 649 (2015) (characterizing deferral as a “tax expenditure”). 
This deferral rule is sometimes called the “deferral privilege.” See, e.g., Fleming, Peroni & Shay, 
Worse Than Exemption, supra note 4, at 85–87. The Subpart F (see I.R.C. §§ 951–965 (2012)) 
and passive foreign investment company (PFIC) (see I.R.C. §§ 1291–1298 (2012)) anti-deferral 
regimes of current U.S. tax law would not prevent deferral from applying in this fact scenario. 
See I.R.C. §§ 954(d)(1), 1297(d) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4) (2010). 
 20. See SHAVIRO, FIXING, supra note 13, at 66 (stating, but not endorsing, 
this argument). 
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exempted from U.S. tax instead of being subject to 
worldwide taxation? 
The preceding two suggestions follow from the premise that there 
is no feasible definition of corporate residence that is less manipulable 
than the current U.S. definition. We reject that premise and the 
related suggestions. 
With respect to worldwide taxation, we have argued in prior 
work21 that the United States unilaterally22 should adopt a real 
worldwide system for taxing the foreign income of U.S. multinational 
enterprises (MNEs).23 Under such a system, the foreign-source and 
U.S.-source income of a U.S. parent corporation and all of its 
domestic and controlled foreign subsidiaries would be aggregated and 
subjected to a current, nondeferred U.S. income tax. There would be 
a credit for foreign income tax payments, subject to the U.S. foreign 
 
 21. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 1, 8, 18–20 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Lipstick]; J. Clifton Fleming 
Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Perspectives on the Worldwide vs. Territorial Taxation 
Debate, 125 TAX NOTES 1079, 1081–82 (2009) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, 
Perspectives]; Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About 
Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Income Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458 
(1999) [hereinafter Peroni, Fleming & Shay, Getting Serious]; see also Robert J. Peroni, Back to 
the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 975, 989–94 (1997) (recommending that the United States strengthen its worldwide 
system and proposing a pass-through system for taxing U.S. persons’ foreign-source income 
earned through a foreign corporation). 
 22. Multilateral harmonization of income tax laws would make a significant contribution 
towards resolving the problems of international income taxation. However, we do not anticipate 
major steps towards harmonization within the foreseeable future. Indeed, we agree with 
Professor Michael Graetz’s view that “international tax competition dominates international tax 
law making. . . . [D]isparities in different countries’ circumstances and interests make ongoing 
inter-nation competition far more likely than substantially more robust international 
cooperation—at least for the foreseeable future.” MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOLLOW THE MONEY: 
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION xix (2016). Consequently, we see the need for the 
United States to develop unilateral reforms to its international income taxation system, including 
a reformed definition of U.S. corporate residence. 
 23. The most basic MNEs are parent/subsidiary structures or pairs of corporations whose 
stock is owned by the same party or parties (i.e., the brother/sister structure). There are virtually 
endless combinations and permutations of these basic patterns. For purposes of this Article, an 
MNE is a parent/subsidiary group of corporations that functions as an economic unit, with at 
least one member being engaged in business activity outside the country in which the MNE 
parent is a resident for tax purposes. 
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tax credit limitation.24 However, under a real worldwide system, 
foreign tax imposed by high-tax foreign countries in excess of U.S. tax 
would not be cross-credited against the U.S. residual tax25 on income 
earned in low-tax foreign countries. Therefore, the foreign tax credit 
limitation of current law would need to be modified to significantly 
reduce cross-crediting. This approach would greatly lessen present 
law’s distortive incentive to choose low-tax foreign countries as 
locations for business or investment activity.26 It would also end the 
so-called “lockout effect” of current law,27 align U.S. international 
income taxation more closely with the ability-to-pay principle that 
underlies the choice of income as the primary U.S. federal tax base,28 
and allow the United States to collect a residual tax on income earned 
by U.S. MNEs in low-tax foreign countries. However, in order to 
function properly, a real worldwide system needs a robust and non-
elective definition of corporate residence. Thus, a major objective of 
this Article is to bolster the case for real worldwide taxation by 
proposing the required definition. 
 
 24. See generally I.R.C. § 904 (2012) (specifying the core rules of the foreign tax credit 
limitation). For a comprehensive discussion of the foreign tax credit limitation, see J. KUNTZ & 
R. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ B4.16 (Westlaw 2016) (ebook). 
 25. A residual tax is the U.S. income tax liability that exceeds any allowable credit for 
foreign income tax payments on foreign-source income. See, e.g., GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, 
supra note 18, at 307. 
 26. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS 20 (2013) [hereinafter CBO, OPTIONS]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-42-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES IN U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER 
INCOME 103 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME]; Fleming, Peroni & 
Shay, Perspectives, supra note 21, at 1084–85. 
 27. See CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 26, at 20; JOINT COMM., CROSS-BORDER INCOME, 
supra note 26, at 103; J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign Tax 
Credit Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax – What’s ETI Repeal Got to Do with It?, 
104 TAX NOTES 1393, 1406, 1414 (2004).  One of us has defined “lockout” as “the 
phenomenon of U.S. multinational enterprises retaining low-taxed foreign earnings in foreign 
subsidiaries to benefit from deferral of U.S. taxation.” Stephen E. Shay, The Truthiness of 
‘Lockout’: A Review of What We Know, 146 TAX NOTES 1393, 1393 (2015). 
 28. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in 
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 
299, 306–27 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness] (discussing in detail the 
relationship between worldwide taxation and the ability-to-pay concept); Fleming, Peroni & 
Shay, Perspectives, supra note 21, at 1091–01; see also AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE 
MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE 8–15 (2013) (tracing the rise of the ability-to-pay concept 
as a fundamental pillar of taxation in the United States). 
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D. Inversions 
Developing a sensible and less manipulable definition of corporate 
residence can also be a critical element in dealing with inversions. For 
example, in the typical corporate inversion scenario, the corporate 
headquarters of the departing U.S. corporation remains in the United 
States.29 Thus, if the United States were to adopt headquarters 
location as an alternative definition of corporate residence (i.e., a 
corporation would be a U.S. resident if it either was formed under the 
law of a U.S. jurisdiction or was headquartered in the United States), 
many inversions might be deterred. This approach has been previously 
suggested30 but, as explained below,31 we ultimately conclude that 
there is a better pathway to the same end. 
E. Corporate Integration 
Recently, corporate tax reform plans that propose integrating the 
separate corporate-level and investor-level taxes on corporate income 
into a unified regime that achieves single taxation of corporate income 
have been touted as partial or total cures for the inversion problem.32 
None of these plans, however, would obviate the need for a reformed 
corporate residence definition. 
The first reason for this conclusion is that integration plans 
generally do not apply to income earned by foreign corporations.33 
 
 29. For descriptions of various inversion transactions, see Bret Wells, Cant and the 
Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429, 430–36 (2012) 
[hereinafter Wells, Inconvenient Truth]. 
 30. See e.g., JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 11, at 179–80; see also 
Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1643–47 (2013) 
[hereinafter Marian, Jurisdiction]. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Burton, Curtis Dubay, David S. Miller, Steven T. 
Miller, Stuart L. Rosow, Eric Toder, Alan D. Viard & Richard A. Westin, Is Corporate Integration 
a Good Idea?, 151 TAX NOTES 1697, 1698–99 (2016) (Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Burton, 
and Curtis Dubay describing and analyzing the desirability of, and methods for achieving, 
corporate integration); Kat Lucero, Hatch Calls Regs Counterproductive, 151 TAX NOTES 157, 
157 (2016). 
 33. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON 
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME 
ONCE 17, 37, 48, 95 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT]; STAFF 
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-44-16, OVERVIEW OF APPROACHES TO CORPORATE 
INTEGRATION 37 (2016) [hereinafter JOINT COMM., INTEGRATION]. 
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Thus, they rely on a classification that distinguishes foreign 
corporations from U.S. resident corporations. 
More importantly, feasible integration schemes actually impose 
some degree of corporate-level taxation on the worldwide incomes of 
U.S. corporations unless implementation of integration is coupled 
with adoption of a territorial system.34 Without territoriality, these 
plans perpetuate the incentives for U.S. corporations to invert into 
low-taxed foreign corporations or to put their new activities into low-
taxed foreign subsidiaries in order to escape U.S. tax on foreign-source 
income and achieve other inversion benefits.35 Thus, unless the United 
States were to enact a territorial system (and we recommend against 
doing so), a robust definition of U.S. corporate residence would be 
necessary even if the United States were to adopt a corporate 
integration plan. 
 
 34. An integration system that imposes a corporate-level tax and then relieves dividends 
from taxation obviously imposes a corporate level-tax on the worldwide income of U.S. resident 
corporations unless a territorial system, which exempts foreign active business income, is 
adopted. See generally U.S. TREAS. DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 17, 39–41 
(describing how a corporation’s foreign-source income would be treated under a corporate 
integration system that relieves dividends from taxation); Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Worse Than 
Exemption, supra note 4, at 82 (explaining that a territorial regime does not tax foreign business 
income). Integration systems that impose a corporate-level tax but that give U.S. resident 
corporations a deduction for dividend payments or that allow U.S. shareholders a credit for 
corporate tax payments related to corporate income distributions effectively apply a corporate-
level tax to undistributed worldwide income, assuming no territorial system. See id. at 95; JOINT 
COMM., INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 34; see also John D. McDonald, A Taxing History—
Why U.S. Corporate Tax Policy Needs to Come Full Circle and Once Again Reflect the Reality of 
the Individual as Taxpayer, 94 TAXES 93, 97 (2016) (“[I]ntegration alone is not sufficient. If 
the United States continues to impose tax on corporations, corporate managers will continue to 
have an incentive to erode the U.S. tax base and re-domicile to more favorable 
tax jurisdictions.”). 
 35. For an explanation of the various forms of inversions and their tax advantages under 
current U.S. law, see DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R43568, CORPORATE EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES 3–5, 10–11 
(2016); DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31444, FIRMS THAT 
INCORPORATE ABROAD FOR TAX PURPOSES: CORPORATE “INVERSIONS” AND “EXPATRIATION” 
3–4 (updated 2007); Steven H. Goldman, Corporate Expatriation: A Case Analysis, 9 FLA. TAX 
REV. 71, 73–76 (2008); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Treasury’s Unfinished Work, supra note 9, at 
935; Eric Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems, 136 TAX 
NOTES 1449 (2012); Steven M. Surdell, Inversions 2014—Self Help International Tax Reform 
for U.S. Multinationals?, 92 TAXES 63 (2014); Wells, Inconvenient Truth, supra note 29, at 430–
36; Bret Wells, What Corporate Inversions Teach About International Tax Reform, 127 TAX 
NOTES 1345, 1349–51 (2010). 
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F. The Way Forward 
Consequently, a principled, efficient, and practical definition of 
corporate residence is required even if some form of corporate 
integration is adopted. More importantly, such a definition is a key 
element in designing either a real worldwide or a territorial income 
tax system and is also a potential restraint on the inversion 
phenomenon. Professor Omri Marian has recently published an 
extensive analysis and evaluation of the alternative approaches for 
defining corporate residence.36 In this Article, we take a somewhat 
different approach from Professor Marian, although we view his work 
and this Article as mutually supportive overall. We focus on developing 
a robust U.S. concept of corporate residence that is based on the 
premise that the U.S. corporate income tax serves principally as a 
device to limit rate gaming and deferral by indirectly imposing a 
current tax on shareholders. 
Specifically, we will argue that the best remedy for the current 
inversion problems created by the U.S. definition of corporate 
residence, and the best approach to strengthening the case for a U.S. 
system of real worldwide taxation, is to amend the U.S. definition of 
corporate residence. Under our proposed amendment, a corporation 
is a U.S. resident for income tax purposes if it was formed under the 
laws of a U.S. jurisdiction, or at least fifty percent of its shares, by vote 
or value, is owned by U.S. residents. This approach would reduce the 
manipulability of the current U.S. definition and counter the 
argument that real worldwide taxation is unattainable because there is 
no feasible, non-elective definition of corporate residence. This 
approach would also prevent U.S. corporations from successfully 
inverting by merging into smaller foreign corporations. This is because 
the surviving corporation, being substantially owned by U.S. 
residents, would itself be a U.S. resident. Thus, both its foreign-source 
income and its earnings stripping receipts would remain in the U.S. 
tax base. Our proposal would also deal with situations where a U.S. 
corporation uses a low-taxed foreign subsidiary to manufacture goods 
 
 36. See generally Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30. Professor Marian proposes a 
definition that would treat a corporation as a U.S. resident if either (1) it is managed or 
controlled from the United States, or (2) its securities are listed on a U.S. exchange or it is 
controlled by a corporation, the securities of which are listed on a U.S. exchange. Id. at 1618. 
Although we prefer our own approach to determining corporate residency set forth in this 
Article, we believe that Professor Marian’s approach would be a considerable improvement over 
existing U.S. tax law. 
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for sale into the U.S. market. Because a U.S. parent would own the 
foreign subsidiary, it would be a U.S. resident and all income shifted 
to it would be part of the U.S. tax base. 
Finally, our proposal has a simplification benefit. This is because 
all foreign corporations controlled by U.S. residents would themselves 
be U.S. residents subject to current worldwide taxation. Thus, if 
comprehensive stock ownership attribution rules were employed for 
purposes of defining control, there would be no need for Subpart F. 
Moreover, there would be a great reduction in the population of 
foreign corporations to which measures for abolishing deferral would 
have to apply. It would be possible to de-link the residence 
classification of a parent corporation from its wholly owned 
subsidiaries where the earnings of a foreign subsidiary corporation 
would, as under current law, eventually be taxed by the United States. 
While our preference would be to extend the residence classification 
to subsidiaries, the proposal retains its importance even if it only were 
applied to the parent corporation of a controlled group.  
Our proposal would not, however, address foreign corporations 
that pursue earnings stripping benefits by acquiring smaller U.S. 
corporations. That problem would have to be dealt with through 
legislation that specifically attacks earnings stripping. We have made 
relevant suggestions in our earlier work.37 
Although the details of our proposal differ from Professor 
Marian’s,38 we agree with him on a very important basic point: it is 
feasible to construct a coherent and non-elective definition of 
corporate residence. 
II. WHY A SHAREHOLDER-BASED DEFINITION? 
A. Why a Corporate Income Tax? 
As indicated in the introduction, we advocate a shareholder-based 
residence approach as a supplement to place-of-incorporation as the 
U.S. definition of corporate residence. To explain our choice, we must 
begin by investigating the reasons for a corporate income tax. 
 
 37. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Earnings Stripping, supra note 15, at 723–37. 
 38. See supra note 36. 
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The corporate income tax originated in the progressive era as a 
device to impose a measure of public control on corporate behavior.39 
The rationale was that because corporate income tax returns were 
public documents under this early regime, corporate operations would 
attract governmental and public scrutiny, which would facilitate 
regulation of corporate behavior.40 This justification vanished, 
however, when corporate opposition resulted in repeal of the 
requirement for public disclosure of returns.41 
Nevertheless, the corporate income tax, minus return disclosure, 
has been rationalized in modern times as a device to regulate corporate 
behavior.42 The thought is that by limiting the buildup of wealth 
within corporations and providing positive incentives through tax 
expenditures and disincentives through denial of deductions and 
credits, the tax system can shape corporate behavior.43 The large net 
worths and cash holdings of U.S. corporations, however, indicate that 
the corporate income tax has not been a meaningful restraint on 
accumulations of corporate wealth.44 And, while the corporate income 
tax has undeniably affected corporate decisions regarding the location 
and composition of business activity,45 its role has been limited outside 
of the business domain. In addition, it has had little or no effect on 
closely related issues such as restraining executive compensation.46 
 
 39. See Marjorie Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 53–57 (1990). 
 40. See id. at 133–35. 
 41. See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Income Tax: A Persistent Challenge, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 73, 81 (2011). 
 42. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1246–49 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Letter to 
the Editor, Tax Reform in the (Multi) National Interest, 124 TAX NOTES 389 (2009) (justifying 
the corporate income tax as a charge for the burdens placed on society by corporate activities). 
This is an alternative way to describe both a penalty tax and a benefits tax. 
 43. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-47-15, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND 
TAX POLICY 15–17 (2015) (describing the impact of tax provisions on corporate 
investment decisions). 
 44. See Adam Davidson, Why Are Corporations Hoarding Trillions?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Jan. 20, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/magazine/why-are-corporations-hoarding-
trillions.html. 
 45. See, e.g., CBO, OPTIONS, supra note 26, at 12. 
 46. For example, studies suggest that the $1 million deductibility cap in Section 162(m) 
of the Code has had little effect on overall executive compensation levels or compensation 
growth rates at corporate taxpayers subject to the cap. See, e.g., Nancy L. Rose & Catherine 
Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation (Nat’l 
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Moreover, the corporate income tax has played little, if any, role in 
causing corporations to significantly address the most pressing social 
and environmental problems of the United States.47 At best, the 
limited role of the corporate income tax in relation to corporate social 
behavior is not a persuasive justification for a thirty-five percent tax on 
corporate income. 
Various benefit rationales have also been advanced in support of 
the U.S. corporate income tax.48 The principal problem with those 
rationales, however, is that there is no obvious linkage between the tax 
a U.S. resident corporation pays to the U.S. Treasury and the 
government benefits enjoyed by that corporation.49 With respect to 
the benefits of operating in the legal form of a corporation, those 
advantages, including limited liability, are largely available to limited 
liability companies and other forms of unincorporated business 
enterprise, such as the limited liability partnership, without payment 
of entity-level tax.50 Benefits rationales are simply inadequate to justify 
 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7842, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7842.pdf. 
 47. We would identify, inter alia, curbing race, gender, and other forms of discrimination, 
protecting the environment, addressing America’s decaying infrastructure, increasing the 
achievements of American students in comparison to those of other countries, and reducing 
American poverty as problems largely or completely unaddressed by the U.S. corporate 
income tax. 
 48. See, e.g., Reporters’ Study, Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, AM. LAW INST., 
49, 51–54 (1999) [hereinafter ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES] (acknowledging the argument that 
a separate corporate tax is justified as a charge for the benefit of limited shareholder liability, but 
finding the argument unpersuasive); Calvin H. Johnson, Replace the Corporate Tax with a Market 
Capitalization Tax, 117 TAX NOTES 1082 (2007) (arguing that a separate corporate tax for 
publicly traded corporations is justified as a tax on the liquidity benefit of access to public 
securities markets); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 994 (1988–89) (earlier work taking a similar position). 
 49. See, e.g., ALI, PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra, note 48, at 60 (“[T]here is no indication 
that the amount of the tax properly reflects the value of the benefit.”); Harry Grubert & Rosanne 
Altshuler, Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International 
Tax, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 671, 707 (2013) (“The corporate tax is not generally characterized as a 
benefit tax.”); Michael S. Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The 
Tensions Between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 24 VA. 
TAX REV. 475 (2005) (expressing doubts that the benefits of incorporating in the United States 
justify the worldwide taxation of corporate income). 
 50. See Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1659 (“[I]t probably makes little sense to 
argue that the current purpose of corporate taxes in the United States is to tax the benefits of 
incorporation. Under the ‘check the box’ regulations, the U.S. is explicitly willing to grant such 
benefits without charging anything for them.”). The “check-the-box” entity classification 
regulations in Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701(2)–(3) (2016) largely make corporate status elective for 
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the modern U.S. corporate income tax with respect to U.S. 
resident corporations.51 
The U.S. corporate income tax has also been justified as a tax on 
economic rents earned by businesses operating in corporate form.52 
This rationale fails, however, because “the corporate income tax as 
currently applied is not a tax on pure profits or economic rents.”53 
Finally, it has been observed that the U.S. corporate income tax 
enjoys the virtue of convenience—it is easier to collect tax on 
corporate income at the entity level instead of pursuing the 
shareholders.54 This rationale, however, is a tacit admission that the 
corporate income tax is actually a tax on shareholders. We agree with 
that characterization. 
 In earlier work,55 we concluded that the principle of ability-to-
pay56 provides the primary justification for the income tax on 
individuals57 and that the U.S. individual income tax is, in fact, based 
on the ability-to-pay principle.58 We then explained that without a tax 
on C corporation59 income at a rate that is substantial in comparison 
to individual tax rates, individuals with capital to invest in corporate 
shares could undermine the ability-to-pay principle by earning income 
through C corporations that bears less tax than the tax borne by others 
 
federal income tax purposes, even for forms of business enterprises that possess significant nontax 
corporate attributes, such as limited liability and centralized management. 
 51. We have argued that U.S. source taxation of nonresident corporations is justifiable on 
the basis of a benefits rationale, see Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 10, at 88–
106, but that is a quite different situation from that of a U.S. resident corporation. 
 52. See MARK P. KEIGHTLY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42726, 
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 15 (2014). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See ALI PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, supra note 48, at 76; McDonald, supra note 34, at 
127–28. 
 55. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 28 (discussing the 
application of the ability-to-pay principle to international income taxation). 
 56. In this Article, we define the ability-to-pay principle as a norm dictating that a taxpayer 
with a larger net income in a particular year should pay more income tax for that year than is 
paid by a taxpayer with a smaller net income for the same year and, at politically agreed levels, 
proportionately more tax. For a discussion of nuances of this norm, see Fleming, Peroni & Shay, 
Fairness, supra note 28, at 301 n.1. 
 57. See id. at 301–02. 
 58. See id. at 302. 
 59. For purposes of this Article, a C corporation is an incorporated entity that pays a 
corporate tax under I.R.C. § 11 (2012). However, we exclude for this purpose entities subject 
to defacto pass-through treatment such as regulated investment companies and real estate 
investment trusts. 
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who have the same or less ability to pay. They could do this by taking 
advantage of deferral of tax on corporate income until dividends are 
paid or shares are sold60 at the cost of a comparatively low corporate 
tax, or at no cost at all if the corporate income tax does not exist.61 A 
substantial tax on C corporation income is a limitation on this strategy 
if corporate income tax is a meaningful burden on shareholders.62 
 Although the incidence of the corporate income tax is a long-
running controversy,63 recent work concludes that most of the burden 
 
 60. See J.D.R. ADAMS & J. WHALLEY, THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION OF 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 8 (1977) (explaining that a 
justification for corporation taxes is that otherwise company profits would escape taxation if the 
income was not distributed to shareholders); KEIGHTLY & SHERLOCK, supra note 52, at 15 
(noting that corporations would be incentivized to retain earnings in order to avoid taxes if not 
for a corporate income tax); U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, INTEGRATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 
95 (explaining that under the imputation credit corporate integration system, shareholders will 
not be required to pay additional tax on distributions of corporate earnings that have already 
been taxed under the corporate tax); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Amir C. Chenchinski, The Case for 
Dividend Deduction, 65 TAX LAW. 3, 7 (2011) (explaining that one argument in favor of the 
corporate tax is that without it, owners would be able to defer the tax, which would effectively 
reduce their tax rate); Daniel I. Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing 
Corporate Rates, 126 TAX Notes, 641, 641–42 (2010) (explaining that without a corporate tax, 
the top marginal rate would be the highest individual rate); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of 
Stateless Income, 65 TAX L. REV. 99, 138–39, 159–60 (2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons] 
(arguing that the corporate income tax is a substitute taxation by which the owners are taxed on 
a current basis by taxing the entity); Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 478–79; see also David A. 
Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: Theory and Doctrine in the 
Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 217 (2007) (“If we imposed only an individual-level income 
tax with the realization requirement, individuals could park assets in shell corporations and avoid 
taxes on capital income. Firm-level taxes, whether collected at the firm level or calculated at the 
firm level and passed through to owners, can be seen as a necessary back-up to individual-level 
income taxes that rely on realization.”). 
 61. See JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 4–5 (2012) (explaining that 
without a high corporate tax rate, individuals may obtain a lower tax rate by using the 
corporation as a tax shelter). 
 62. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra, note 28, at 320–21. In earlier work, we 
stated that the corporate income tax “cannot be explained on ability-to-pay grounds because 
liability under the corporate-level tax is calibrated to the taxable income of the corporation and 
bears no necessary relationship to the respective abilities to pay of any individuals.” Id. at 319. 
This language is inartful and creates a misimpression. By it we meant that the corporate income 
tax is not directly based on the ability-to-pay of either the corporation or the shareholders. 
Instead, as explained in this Article, our view is that the corporate income tax serves as a defense 
against attempts to undermine the ability-to-pay principle and, therefore, is justified by 
that principle. 
 63. For an early discussion of this controversy, see William A. Klein, The Incidence of the 
Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer’s View of a Problem in Economics, 1965 WISC. L. REV. 576. 
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of this tax falls on owners of capital, including shareholders.64 Thus, a 
substantial corporate income tax serves as a restraint on use of the C 
corporation to undermine the ability-to-pay principle. To be sure, it is 
a crude restraint in that its primary incidence falls on capital 
generally,65 not just on shareholders, and its rates are not calibrated to 
either the rates of individual shareholders or the length of time the 
individual tax on dividends or gains from share sales is deferred.66 
Nevertheless, there is nothing better and so the corporate income tax 
serves as a second best limitation on the capacity of investors to 
minimize the effects of the ability-to-pay principle by strategically 
employing C corporations. 
 The preceding analysis, however, must be re-examined in light 
of recent work showing that approximately seventy-five percent of 
U.S. C corporation equity is owned by tax-exempt shareholders that 
 
 64. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
FEDERAL TAXES, 2013, at 26 (2016) (“CBO allocated 75 percent of corporate income taxes to 
owners of capital in proportion to their income from interest, dividends, rents, and adjusted 
capital gains . . . . CBO allocated the remaining 25 percent of corporate income taxes to workers 
in proportion to their labor income.”); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-14–13, 
MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES ON BUSINESS INCOME 30 (2013) (Joint Committee 
Staff regards owners of capital as bearing 100 percent of the corporate income tax burden in the 
short run and 75 percent of corporate income taxes in the long run with the remainder not 
distributed to domestic and foreign owners of capital being borne by labor); GRAVELLE & 
HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 29 (“[I]t appears that most of the burden of the corporate tax 
falls on capital (and were debt considered, it is possible that labor benefits from the tax).”); JIM 
NUNNS, URBAN INST. AND URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC DISTRIBUTES 
THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX 10 (2012) (“TPC’s updated long-run incidence assumptions for 
the corporate income tax are that 60 percent . . . falls on supernormal returns, 20 percent on 
labor income, and 20 percent on the normal return to all capital. . . . We assume the burden on 
supernormal returns falls only on shareholders . . . .”); Julie Anne Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura 
Power & Michael Cooper, Distributing the Corporate Income Tax: Revised U.S. Treasury 
Methodology, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 239, 239–40 (2013) (U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Tax 
Analysis assumes that 82 percent of the corporate income tax is borne by capital income and 18 
percent is borne by labor); Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General 
Equilibrium Estimates and Analysis, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 185, 211 (2013) (describing an approach 
that treats over 90 percent of the corporate tax burden as borne by domestic capital); Li Liu & 
Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax Under Imperfect 
Competition, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 215, 233 (2013) (“The average labor share of the corporate tax 
burden is around 60–80 percent.”). But see Kimberly A. Clausing, Who Pays the Corporate Tax 
in a Global Economy?, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 151, 180 (2013) (“[T]here is very little robust evidence 
linking corporate tax rates and wages.”). 
 65. See authorities cited in supra note 64. 
 66. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 28, at 319 n.46. 
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do not pay tax on dividend income or gains from stock sales.67 Thus, 
with respect to these shareholders, the corporate income tax cannot 
be rationalized as a measure that prevents investors from minimizing 
their shareholder-level tax liability. 
 Nevertheless, we conclude that even as to the portion of the 
corporate income tax that is borne by tax-exempt shareholders, the 
tax is effectively an indirect levy on those shareholders. Our analysis 
runs this way: there is no normative right to income tax exemption for 
charities, other non-profits, and retirement plans.68 Tax relief granted 
to those entities is thus a subsidy provided to achieve various ends.69 
Given the absence of a norm, Congress is free to decide the degree of 
subsidy that it is willing to provide to exempt entities. Its decision is 
that tax-exempt entities are not wholly tax-exempt. They generally are 
excused from federal income tax on their unlevered dividends and 
gains from share sales,70 but they must bear tax on unrelated business 
taxable income as well as corporate-level tax on the income that is 
earned through their corporate equity investments71 (except to the 
extent that the corporate income tax is shifted to other forms of capital 
and to labor).72 Thus, the corporate income tax turns out to be a 
burden even on tax-exempt shareholders, although not for reasons 
directly related to ability-to-pay.73 
 Of course, this analysis heightens the incongruous treatment of 
interest received on corporate debt held by tax-exempt entities. In 
general, this interest is deductible74 by the corporate payors. Thus, it 
 
 67. See Steven M. Rosenthal & Lydia S. Austin, The Dwindling Taxable Share of U.S. 
Corporate Stock, 151 TAX NOTES 923, 930 (2016). 
 68. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. REV. 
283, 286 (2011). 
 69. See id. at 301–02 (“[A] normal income tax generally would impose a tax burden on 
investment income. Thus, failure to tax such income earned by a charity represents a subsidy.”). 
 70. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (2012). 
 71. See I.R.C. § 11 (2012). 
 72. See authorities cited in supra note 64.  The issue of whether the existence and scope 
of the tax subsidy accorded tax-exempt organizations is appropriate is an important and large 
topic that is outside the scope of this Article. 
 73. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-26-05, TESTIMONY OF GEORGE K. YIN, 
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AT A HEARING OF THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON “AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAX-EXEMPT SECTOR” 2–4 
(2005) (discussing the reasons for tax exemptions). 
 74. The general deduction provision for interest expense is I.R.C. § 163(a) (2012). The 
exceptions are I.R.C. § 163(f), (h), (i), (j), (l) (2012). 
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does not directly bear the corporate-level income tax;75 it bears that 
tax only to the extent that there is shifting from corporate equity 
investments to debt capital.76 There does not appear to be much of a 
shift, however, because the Congressional Research Service has found 
that “[t]he aggregate tax burden on debt is slightly negative, while 
equity is taxed at close to 40%.”77 Assuming that is the case, corporate 
debt investments by tax-exempt entities bear less of a corporate 
income tax burden than the corporate equity investments of those 
entities. If that is true, however, it is equally true with respect to the 
corporate debt investments and corporate equity investments of 
taxable investors and it does nothing more than illustrate the 
longstanding inconsistent tax treatment of corporate debt and 
corporate equity.78 This is an incongruity that seems unlikely to be 
eliminated in the near term and that requires remediation that is 
clearly outside the scope of this Article. 
 For purposes of this Article, we conclude that the best rationale 
for a substantial tax on corporate income is that it is a tool (1) to 
crudely interdict efforts by taxable equity investors to undermine the 
ability-to-pay principle79 and (2) to limit the degree of subsidy 
provided to tax-exempt equity investors. With respect to both types 
of investors, therefore, the target of the corporate income tax is a 
corporation’s shareholders.  
 
B. A Shareholder Tax Leads to a Shareholder-Based 
Residence Definition 
 
The above discussion concludes that direct or indirect 
shareholders are the ultimate targets of the U.S. tax on corporate 
income. For that reason, the task of properly defining corporate 
residence should focus on constructing a definition that reflects the 
 
 75. See GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 33 (“[A]t the firm level, equity is 
subject to a tax rate of around 30% while debt is subsidized at about the same level (a negative 
32% tax rate).”). We exclude interest from a controlled entity taxable under I.R.C. 
§ 512(b)(13) (2012). 
 76. See authorities cited in supra note 64. 
 77. See GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 61, at 32. 
 78. See id. at 32–33. 
 79. See id. at 4 (“As long as taxes on individual income are imposed, a significant corporate 
income tax is likely to be necessary to forestall use of the corporation as a tax shelter.”). 
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centrality of shareholder residence. This is not a radical idea. The 
United States has already moved toward a shareholder-based 
corporate residence definition by adopting Section 7874. This section 
provides that if the foreign surviving corporation in an inversion is at 
least eighty percent owned (based on either the vote or value of its 
stock) by former shareholders of the inverted U.S. corporation, then 
the foreign corporation will be considered a U.S. resident.80 
The conclusion that the United States should adopt a shareholder-
based definition of corporate residence means that there must be rules 
defining the residence of shareholders. Determining the precise 
contour of those rules is a large, independent topic that is outside the 
scope of this Article,81 and so we do not undertake to craft those rules 
in this work. Instead, we limit ourselves to observing that in present 
law there are useful starting points in Section 7701(b) with respect to 
individual shareholders, Section 7701(a)(4) and (a)(5) with respect to 
incorporated tax-exempt organizations, and Section 7701(a)(30)(E) 
and (a)(31)(B) with respect to tax-exempt trusts. 
III. A SHAREHOLDER-BASED DEFINITION IS FEASIBLE 
A. The Frequent Trading Objection 
A shareholder-based definition of corporate residence is clearly 
feasible with respect to closely held corporations because information 
regarding shareholder identity and residence will usually be readily 
available. Some commentators, however, argue that because 
ownership of the shares of publicly traded corporations changes 
frequently, shareholder residence is unworkable as a test for the tax 
residence of publicly held entities.82 While this argument would have 
some traction if the object were to accurately attribute corporate 
income to various shareholders, that is not the goal with respect to 
determining corporate residence. To illustrate, we recommend that 
the United States adopt a rule that treats a corporation as a U.S. 
 
 80. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012). 
 81. For example, there is a significant body of literature dealing with whether individuals 
who are U.S. citizens but who have no physical presence in the United States should be treated 
as U.S. residents for income tax purposes. See, e.g., Michael Kirsch, Revisiting the Tax Treatment 
of Citizens Abroad: Reconciling Principle and Practice, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 117 (2014); Ruth 
Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169 (2016). 
 82. See GRAETZ, supra note 22, at 140; Graetz, Taxing International Income, supra note 
2, at 323; Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. 
Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 415 (2010). 
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resident for any year if on the last day of the preceding year, fifty 
percent or more of its shares (determined by vote or value) is owned 
by U.S. residents. Under this rule, frequent share trading during the 
year would be irrelevant because the rule would operate on the basis 
of a snapshot taken at the end of the immediately preceding year. If 
such a rule were judged vulnerable to year-end gaming, then it could 
be modified to operate on the basis of the average of the snapshots 
taken on the last day of each quarter during the preceding year. In any 
event, frequent share trading would not hamper the rule’s operation. 
Moreover, this snapshot approach would be feasible because we would 
be determining the aggregate extent to which foreign corporations’ 
equity is U.S. owned, not the shares of their incomes that should be 
attributed to specific shareholders (an admittedly more difficult task). 
Because the shares of U.S. corporations are predominantly in the 
hands of U.S. residents,83 it is unlikely that share trading would cause 
a corporation to frequently change from resident to nonresident, and 
vice versa, on account of the corporation often finding itself on 
different sides of the fifty-percent line proposed above. If that were a 
concern, however, averaging share ownership snapshots over a three- 
or five-year period for purposes of applying the proposed fifty-percent 
test could ameliorate the risk. 
B. The Intermediary Objection 
It might be suggested that the preceding proposal is meaningless 
because the use of multiple layers of intermediaries will make it 
impossible to know who owns shares in many cases.84 We have two 
responses to this objection. First, our proposal does not require 
knowledge of the separate identities of shareowners. Instead, it 
requires knowledge of an aggregate—i.e., whether U.S. residents, 
who need not be specifically identified, own fifty percent or more of 
 
 83. A recent study found that foreign residents owned $5,543 trillion (24.3%) of the 
$22,812 trillion U.S. C corporation stock outstanding at the end of 2015. See Rosenthal & 
Austin, supra note 67, at 927. However, by using a definition of U.S. corporate equity that was 
broader than C corporation stock, the Joint Committee Staff calculated that foreign investors 
held only 17.4% of U.S. corporate equities at the close of 2015. See JOINT COMM., 
INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 15. For a description of uncertainties in the data, see Chris 
William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nationality, 
68 TAX L. REV. 207 (2015). 
 84. See, e.g., GRAETZ, supra note 22, at 140 (noting that assessing the “true” residence 
of a corporation is seemingly impractical with regard to multi-tiered multinationals). 
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the vote or value of a corporation’s shares. If there is sufficient 
information to allow a determination that this aggregate benchmark 
is satisfied with respect to a particular corporation, then that 
corporation is a U.S. tax resident even if complex tiers of shareholding 
obscure ownership of the remainder of its stock. This should reduce 
the size of the problem presented by layers of intermediary owners. 
Our second, and perhaps more important, response to the 
intermediary ownership objection is that we now live in a post-
FATCA85 world. It is not a large step from that world to one in which 
publicly traded corporations are required to know the extent to which 
their shares are beneficially owned by U.S. residents. FATCA itself 
generally provides that corporations, whether U.S. or foreign, that pay 
U.S.-source dividends to foreign financial institutions must confirm 
that the foreign financial institution has complied with due diligence 
requirements to identify the U.S. beneficial owners of accounts and 
certain investment entities holding the shares or withhold a thirty-
percent tax and remit it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).86 
In addition, the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the 
European Union (EU) requires that each EU member state direct its 
domestic corporations to maintain accurate, current information 
regarding beneficial ownership of their shares and to make it available 
to governmental authorities.87 Moreover, Norway has adopted 
legislation establishing a public registry of corporate ownership 
information.88 We submit that the United States is operating in a world 
where a snapshot of aggregate U.S. share ownership, even when layers 
of intermediaries and frequent trading are involved, is, or soon can 
be, knowable.89 
 
 85. FATCA refers to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 
§§ 501, 511, 124 Stat. 71, 109–110 (2010). The salient provisions of FATCA are in I.R.C. §§ 
1471–1474, 6038D (2012). For a detailed discussion of these provisions, see KUNTZ & PERONI, 
supra note 24, at ¶¶ B1.08[6][A], C2.10. 
 86. See GUSTAFSON, PERONI & PUGH, supra note 18, at 276–77. 
 87. See Roman Seer, The European AEOI: Risks and Opportunities of Anti-Money 
Laundering Acts, in 13 NEW EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION VERSUS TAX SOLUTIONS OF 
EQUIVALENT EFFECT 57, 73 (Giuseppe Marino ed., EATLP Int’l Tax Series 2015). 
 88. See Sophie Haggerty, Norway Latest Country to Adopt Public Registry of Beneficial 
Ownership, GLOBAL FIN. INTEGRITY (June 15, 2015), http://www.gfintegrity.org/norway-
latest-country-to-adopt-public-registry-of-beneficial -ownership/. 
 89. Professor Chris Sanchirico has argued that neither Treasury data nor federal securities 
law disclosures presently allow the U.S. ownership of large multinational corporations to be 
determined. See Sanchirico, supra note 83. His analysis, however, does not take into account the 
FATCA and EU developments described in the text at supra notes 85–89. 
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This proposition raises an interesting question. If we are moving 
to a world where it is possible to know whether a foreign-incorporated 
entity is fifty percent or more owned by U.S. residents, can we then 
determine the precise percentage of U.S. resident ownership and limit 
U.S. taxation of a foreign-incorporated entity’s foreign income to that 
percentage? Our response is that it is much easier to determine that a 
foreign-incorporated entity is at least fifty percent owned by U.S. 
residents than it is to determine the precise percentage of U.S. 
ownership. Consequently, we are not presently prepared to 
recommend that the percentage of a foreign-incorporated entity’s 
foreign income that is subject to U.S. taxation should be defined by 
the percentage of the entity’s equity that is owned by U.S. residents. 
As tax enforcement progresses, however, this step may 
become feasible.90 
C. The Related Party Objection 
As for the problem of determining beneficial ownership when 
stock is held by related parties, the United States has shown those 
difficulties can be dealt with through indirect and constructive stock 
ownership rules. Crafting the details of these rules is a task for another 
article. Here we limit ourselves to observing that the existing rules in 
Section 958 have proven workable and generally effective in the 
international context.91  
 We recognize that derivatives that draw their value from shares 
of a particular corporation’s stock92 can potentially be used to 
circumvent indirect and constructive stock ownership provisions. The 
development of rules to deal with derivatives is, however, a large 
undertaking93 that is outside the scope of this Article. Consequently, 
 
 90. We thank both Professor David Elkins and Ricardo Augusto Gil Reis Rodrigues of 
the Doctor of International Business Taxation Program at the Vienna University of Economics 
and Business for calling this point to our attention. 
 91. See I.R.C. § 958 (2012).  For a comprehensive discussion of these rules, see KUNTZ 
& PERONI, supra 24, at ¶ B3. 
 92. For a description of such derivatives, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX- 
56-11, PRESENT LAW AND ISSUES RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND PRODUCTS 1–2 (2011). 
 93. See generally id. (providing a lengthy study of the issues presented by derivatives). U.S. 
courts have experience examining the substance of derivative contracts to determine ownership 
for tax purposes. For a recent court decision involving a failed attempt by the taxpayer to use 
derivatives to obtain an inappropriate tax result, see Anschutz v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 78 
(2010), aff’d, 664 F.3d 313 (10th Cir. 2011) (Tax Court rejecting attempted use of derivatives 
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we do not address issues raised by derivatives except to say that 
derivatives conferring the essential economic benefits of stock 
ownership on U.S. resident derivative holders would be treated as 
stock owned by U.S. residents for purposes of our proposal. 
D. A Public Trading-Based Presumption 
Taxpayers have fertile imaginations when it comes to creating 
arrangements that are difficult for the IRS to analyze and understand. 
Thus, our proposed shareholder-based residency test may turn out to 
be difficult for the IRS to administer. An effective response would be 
to recognize that if a corporation’s shares are traded in U.S. securities 
markets, those shares are most likely marketed to and primarily held 
by U.S. residents.94 Consequently, we suggest that our proposed 
shareholder-based residency definition be strengthened by a 
rebuttable presumption that a foreign corporation is a U.S. tax 
resident if any class of its shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S. 
public capital markets or is marketed to U.S. persons.95 
This approach may seem problematic because it might create a bias 
against listing companies in the United States.96 In the worst case 
scenario, as the argument goes, former U.S. corporations and historic 
foreign corporations might de-list their shares in the United States and 
list them on foreign stock exchanges, such as in London, Frankfurt, 
and Paris.97 However, since substantial share ownership of a 
corporation by U.S. residents would alone be sufficient to make the 
corporation a U.S. tax resident under our proposal, a corporation that 
seeks U.S. investors would usually wind up in U.S. resident status, 
even if it listed its shares outside the United States. Thus, a corporation 
typically would lose little by a U.S. listing and a corporate residency 
test based on trading in U.S. capital markets should not be a significant 
barrier to U.S. listings. With respect to this proposed presumption, it 
 
to monetize shares while avoiding ten-year Section 1374 built-in gains tax by postponing formal 
transfer of shares). 
 94. Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1663. 
 95. See id. at 1663–64. Shares would be presumed to be marketed to U.S. persons if 
disclosure documents discussed the consequences of classification of the foreign corporation as 
a controlled foreign corporation or a PFIC. 
 96. See Am. Bar Ass’n Tax Sec. Task Force on Int’l Reform, Report of the Task Force on 
International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 753 (Spring 2006) [hereinafter ABA Tax Section 
Task Force Report]; Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1647. 
 97. See ABA Tax Section Report, supra note 96, at 753. 
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is useful to note that for purposes of determining whether transferors 
of U.S. corporate stock to a foreign corporation are U.S. persons, the 
Section 367 regulations adopt a presumption that persons transferring 
stock of a domestic corporation are U.S. persons.98 The presumption 
is rebutted if the contrary is shown through ownership statements 
from transferors.99 
Finally, we should note that we view this proposed presumption as 
a transition rule of sorts that eventually will be deleted from the 
classification structure that we hope will be enacted into law. In our 
view, once shareholder beneficial ownership information is required to 
be available and foreign corporations are in a position to more readily 
determine the identity of their shareholders, this public trading 
presumption will no longer be necessary and could be eliminated. 
E. Alternate Tests 
For the reasons discussed above, we propose that the United 
States adopt a shareholder-based definition of corporate residence that 
is structured as follows: 
A foreign corporation is a U.S. tax resident for any year if fifty 
percent or more of its shares, determined by vote or value, was 
beneficially owned by U.S. residents on the last day of the immediately 
preceding year (or was the average ownership for the year by U.S. 
residents as determined by averaging U.S. resident ownership on the 
last day of each quarter of the preceding year). A foreign corporation 
presumptively satisfies this threshold if any class of its shares is 
regularly traded in one or more U.S. public capital markets or 
marketed to U.S. persons. 
A foreign corporation can rebut this presumption by showing that 
U.S. resident beneficial ownership of its shares is below the fifty-
percent threshold. The IRS can overcome the presumption in the 
same way if it encounters cases where a corporation that is actually 
foreign-owned lists a class of shares on a U.S. exchange in order to 
achieve U.S. resident status for tax-avoidance reasons. 
The proposed shareholder-ownership test would, however, be an 
alternate definition. A corporation would continue to be a U.S. tax 
 
 98. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(2) (2015). 
 99. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-3(c)(7) (2015). 
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resident if it were formed under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction.100 This 
approach has a convenience justification because it will eliminate the 
need to inquire into stock ownership in many cases. But, that raises 
the question of whether it is hypocritical for us to propose 
continuation of the U.S. place-of-incorporation definition of 
corporate residence after having gone to such lengths to argue that a 
shareholder-based definition is the proper approach in principle. 
We believe that continued use of the place-of-incorporation 
approach is appropriate because that definition is a decent proxy for 
U.S. share ownership. This is because the shares of U.S. corporations 
are, on average, predominantly owned by U.S. residents.101 This fact 
is not surprising in light of the well-recognized “home bias” in 
portfolio investments, which is demonstrated by the fact that investors 
hold a larger share of local equities in their portfolios than would be 
predicted by theories regarding the benefits of international 
investment diversification.102 Thus, the place-of-incorporation 
definition of corporate residence is an acceptable rough justice rule,103 
even though a theoretically pure definition would be based exclusively 
on stock ownership. 
If one were seriously concerned about outliers that fall beyond the 
reasonable scope of average cases, one could make the place-of-
incorporation definition rebuttable by U.S. corporations that 
demonstrate U.S. resident beneficial ownership of their shares is below 
the fifty-percent benchmark. If such an approach were taken, the IRS 
should also be able to overcome this presumption on the same basis 
 
 100. A corporation, however, should not be characterized as a nonresident solely because 
it is formed under foreign law. Doing so would create the problematic result of corporations 
escaping U.S. resident status by means of foreign incorporation even when owned by 
U.S. residents. 
 101. See generally JOINT COMM., INTEGRATION, supra note 33, at 15 (discussing the share 
of U.S. corporations owned by foreign investors); Rosenthal & Austin, supra note 67, at 927 
(analyzing the various different holders of stock in taxable accounts); Sanchirico, supra note 83 
(discussing uncertainties in stock ownership data). 
 102. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-15, PRESENT LAW AND SELECTED 
POLICY ISSUES IN THE U.S. TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME 35–36 (2015); Roger H. 
Gordon & James R. Hines, Jr., International Taxation 37 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/WP2002-2paper.pdf; see also Lars Hornuf & Matthias Schmitt, Does 
a Local Bias Exist in Equity Crowdfunding? The Impact of Investor Types and Portal Design 23–
24 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation & Competition, Research Paper No. 16-07, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2801170 (finding a general local bias within Germany with respect 
to equity crowdfunding investments). 
 103. See Marian, Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1652; see also Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 
60, at 159–60. 
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in order to deal with cases where a foreign-owned corporation is 
formed under U.S. law for tax-avoidance reasons. On balance, 
however, we reject this exception to the place-of-incorporation 
definition on grounds of administrative complexity. The possibility to 
rebut U.S. residence in the event of more-than-fifty-percent foreign 
ownership would, among other effects, (i) require each corporate 
taxpayer to consider the option; (ii) require appropriately 
strengthened tax rules for the transition from a domestic to a foreign 
corporation; and (iii) potentially provide a windfall gain to 
shareholders in predominantly foreign-owned U.S. corporations who 
acquired their shares at prices reflecting the burden of U.S. tax 
residence. Moreover, U.S. incorporation does not happen unless it is 
affirmatively chosen. Thus, in our view, there are relatively few outliers 
who would be harmed by the place-of-incorporation definition. 
F. Other Proxies 
In Section III.E of this Article,104 we advocated using U.S. 
incorporation as an alternate U.S. residency test because U.S. 
incorporation seems to be an effective proxy for substantial U.S. share 
ownership. In this Section, we examine additional possible proxies. 
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has recommended 
that a publicly traded foreign-incorporated entity be treated as a U.S. 
tax resident if its headquarters are located in the United States.105 In a 
similar vein, Professor George Yin has proposed treating a foreign 
corporation as a U.S. tax resident if its principal customer base is in 
the United States.106 Finally, Professor Adam Rosenzweig has 
proposed completely eliminating the present place-of-incorporation 
test and characterizing both U.S.-incorporated and foreign-
incorporated entities as U.S. tax residents if (1) fifty percent or more 
of the gross income of a corporation for a year is U.S.-source, or (2) 
at least half of the average percentage of assets held by the corporation 
during the year produces U.S.-source income or is held for production 
of U.S.-source income.107 
 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 100–102. 
 105. See JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 11, at 179–80; Marian, 
Jurisdiction, supra note 30, at 1643–47. 
 106. See George K. Yin, Letter to the Editor, Stopping Corporate Inversions Sensibly and 
Legally, 144 TAX NOTES 1087, 1087–88 (2014). 
 107. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 507. 
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In this Article, we have argued that U.S. corporate tax residency 
should be linked to the residence of the owners of a significant block 
of the corporation’s shares. It seems to us that because of the stock 
ownership data and home country bias referred to in Section III.E,108 
a corporation that satisfies any of the three immediately preceding 
residency definitions likely would have a substantial block of its shares 
in the hands of U.S. residents. Thus, these tests would be substantially 
consistent with our shareholder-residence approach. Nevertheless, it 
would be appropriate to allow foreign corporations to escape the 
preceding tests by proving that ownership of their shares by U.S. 
residents does not actually satisfy the fifty-percent benchmark 
described in Section III.A. 
More importantly, even in the corporate inversion context, each 
of the three preceding tests is likely to have undesirable behavioral 
effects. The headquarters test will obviously deter corporations from 
maintaining their headquarters in the United States. Indeed, there is 
an adequate number of tax-advantaged foreign locations where U.S. 
managers can be stationed without their having to learn another 
language or sacrifice lifestyle comforts (e.g., Dublin, London, 
or Singapore).109 
Likewise, Professor Yin’s customer base test would have an adverse 
behavioral element. It would encourage corporations to limit the sales 
they make to U.S. buyers. We recognize that the attractiveness of the 
U.S. market would overcome this effect in most cases, but given the 
fact that our shareholder residence-based test would be an effective 
tool against manipulation of corporate residency, we see no reason to 
incur the behavioral risk inherent in Professor Yin’s test, even if the 
risk is small. We have a similar reservation with respect to Professor 
Rosenzweig’s proposed test because it would encourage corporations 
to limit their U.S.-source income and their U.S.-based 
production assets. 
An alternative approach would be to treat a foreign-incorporated 
entity for tax purposes in the same manner as an individual and 
analogize the determination of corporate residence to the 
determination of whether a foreign individual is a resident of the 
United States. Although we reject this approach, it is worth the 
 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 101–103. 
 109. See generally Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REV. 169, 188–89 (2008). But see 
Marian, Jursidiction, supra note 30, at 1645–46 (arguing the contrary). 
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following brief exploration. Foreign individuals are classified as 
residents for U.S. federal income tax purposes if they are accorded 
permanent resident (i.e., green card) status for immigration purposes 
or if they maintain a substantial presence in the United States (which 
generally is measured by days of physical presence in the 
United States).110 
To maintain this analogy with an individual, a foreign-
incorporated entity could be considered a U.S. tax resident if it 
maintained a substantial presence in the United States.111 One way to 
measure substantial presence would be if more than fifty percent of its 
operating assets were located in the United States for more than 183 
days in a year.112 This substantial presence approach would provide a 
fully adequate basis for the United States to assert jurisdiction to tax a 
foreign corporation’s worldwide income.113 Although this approach is 
similar to the assets prong of Professor Rosenzweig’s proposal, it 
would not use the income prong. We do not agree with looking to 
the amount of U.S.-source income as a residence test because, as 
recognized by Professor Rosenzweig, it closely aligns with a formula 
apportionment-like exemption of foreign income. We do not view this 
as a positive feature for a corporation predominantly owned by U.S. 
persons, because it defeats the underlying ability-to-pay objective of 
an income-based tax system. 
 
 110. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 111. This analogy of an entity to an individual is incomplete, for among other reasons, 
because it does not take into account the incidence of the corporate income tax. 
 112. The same-country dividends and interest exception to the definition of Subpart F 
foreign personal holding company income includes a requirement that the controlled foreign 
corporation have “a substantial part of its assets used in its trade or business located in such . . . 
country.” I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A)(i) (2012). The regulations apply a 50 percent substantial assets 
test for this purpose and provide rules for identifying the location of tangible and intangible 
assets. Treas. Reg. § 4.954-2(b)(3)(iv)–(xi) (2016) (providing rules for valuing and determining 
the location of tangible and intangible assets of a controlled foreign corporation). For a detailed 
discussion of the same-country dividends and interest exception, see KUNTZ & PERONI, supra 
note 24, at ¶ B3.05[2][k1]. 
 113. If this suggestion were adopted, it would be possible to employ the PFIC 25 percent 
stock ownership look-through rule to test the assets of a foreign holding company. But what if 
there was a non-U.S. parent holding company with both a U.S. subsidiary and a non-U.S. 
subsidiary, and the U.S. subsidiary held just over 50 percent of the group’s total assets? Could 
the United States rely on jurisdiction over the U.S. subsidiary to assert jurisdiction to tax the 
worldwide income of the rest of the group? Based on existing law, the answer is affirmative and 
it likely is possible to obtain the relevant information. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6038A (2012). However, 
collection may have to rely on jurisdiction over the U.S. assets. 
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More broadly, we do agree with Professors Rosenzweig and Yin 
that it is possible, and in the right case appropriate, to de-emphasize 
theory and adopt an instrumental, anti-tax avoidance approach to 
defining corporate residence. Nevertheless, an entity-level test that is 
not based on shareholder residence and that is not effectively elective 
will always be over- and under-inclusive in relation to our preferred 
shareholder residence criterion. It will be over-inclusive to the extent 
that it taxes foreign income of a predominantly foreign-owned 
corporation. It will be under-inclusive to the extent it fails to tax 
foreign income of a corporation predominantly owned by U.S. 
persons.114 In addition, entity-level classification based on U.S. 
location of assets and activities is substantially equivalent to adopting 
a de facto formulary exemption system. We have explained our 
objections to such a system in earlier work.115 
In the end, we conclude that our shareholder-based residence test, 
supplemented with the existing place-of-incorporation test, provides 
the best approach. 
G. The Dual Residence Problem 
Our proposed use of multiple corporate residence definitions 
would, of course, increase the number of corporations that are treated 
as dual residents with respect to the U.S. international income taxation 
system. However, several other countries with large economies 
employ multiple corporate residency tests without encountering 
unmanageable difficulties.116 The same would likely be true with 
respect to the United States. Thus, we do not see this concern as a 
significant barrier to adopting our multi-part approach to defining 
corporate residence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With respect to taxable shareholders, an unintegrated tax on 
corporate earnings, set at a relatively high rate, is best justified as a 
crude tax on those shareholders that prevents them from gaming the 
differences between individual and corporate tax rates and blocks 
 
 114. Professor Rosenzweig points out other over- and under-inclusive features of his test 
as well. Rosenzweig, supra note 2, at 479.  In the text following supra note 109, we also have 
noted behavorial problems regarding Professor Rosenzweig’s test. 
 115. See generally Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Lipstick, supra note 21 (discussing the problems 
with a formulary apportionment system). 
 116. See AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 11, at 434–36. 
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corporations from being used as egregious tax deferral devices. With 
respect to tax-exempt shareholders, the corporate tax carries out the 
congressional policy of applying one level of tax to the corporate 
equity investments of those shareholders. These points lead to the 
further conclusion that the definition of corporate residence that is 
employed in the U.S. income tax should be based on shareholder 
residence because shareholders are the ultimate targets of the 
corporate income tax.  
We have argued that the best way to accomplish this end is to take 
a multi-part approach that first defines a corporation as a U.S. resident 
if it is incorporated in a U.S. jurisdiction. This is justifiable because the 
data shows that, on average, such corporations are predominately 
owned by U.S. residents. In addition, we have argued that a foreign-
incorporated entity should be treated as a U.S. resident if on a snapshot 
date or dates, at least fifty percent of its shares, by vote or value, is 
owned by U.S. residents. We have also argued for bolstering this 
alternative definition of corporate residence with a rebuttable 
presumption that foreign-incorporated entities are U.S. residents if at 
least one class of their shares is regularly traded in one or more U.S. 
capital markets or is marketed to U.S. persons. This presumption 
derives from the insight that if a corporation markets its shares to U.S. 
investors, the shares are likely to be primarily held by U.S. residents—
a conclusion that is supported by the well-recognized home bias of 
investors. A foreign corporation could, however, rebut this 
presumption by demonstrating that U.S. residents own less than fifty 
percent of both the vote and value of its shares. 
This multi-part approach to defining corporate residence would 
remove the principal tax advantages of inversion transactions in which 
a U.S. corporation merges into a smaller foreign corporation. This is 
so because the surviving foreign corporation would be treated as a 
U.S. tax resident under our proposal. More importantly, our approach 
would bolster the case for real worldwide taxation by making 
corporate tax residence a largely non-elective matter. 
 
